Crime patterns between tradition and change: a territorial analysis of the Italian provinces by SOLIVETTI, Luigi Maria
1 
 
Crime Patterns between Tradition and Change: 
A Territorial Analysis of the Italian Provinces 
Author: Luigi Maria Solivetti 
 
Department of Social Sciences and Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, August 2015. The final 
publication – Social Indicators Research – is available at Springer via DOI: 10.1007/s11205-015-1043-1 
 
Abstract 
Violent criminality associated with Mafia-type organizations has been crucial for the 
image of Italy’s crime. This paper purpose is to verify whether the contemporary 
situation still matches that image and what has been the impact on crime of more recent 
factors, above all foreign immigration. Indeed, Italy has been characterized by a recent 
but tumultuous migratory flow, which has possibly posed difficulties for immigrants’ 
integration. The territorial analysis, carried out on 103 Italian provinces, shows two 
discrete scenarios. When all the provinces are considered, serious offences such as 
intentional homicides, extortions, criminal conspiracies and robberies are still 
associated with a traditional scenario of socio-economic backwardness and poor social 
capital. However, when only the Central and Northern provinces are selected, a new, 
non-traditional form of criminality, associated with “modern” features, such as the 
presence of immigrants and their problems of integration, clearly emerges. 
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1. Introduction and Main Theoretical Considerations 
Italy’s crime image has been moulded by the age-old presence of serious, often violent, 
crimes (firstly, homicides and extortions) revolving around local criminal organizations 
of the Mafia type and regarded as associated with familism, lack of trust – and therefore 
limited social capital – and underdevelopment (Hess 1974; Gambetta 1993; Paoli 
2004). The importance of this typology has been emphasized by the fact that it has been 
considered the original form of organised crime, later exported to the US and other 
countries (Varese 2011). However, Italy is also well known for being a country with 
more marked regional differences than those found in the other Western countries. 
These marked differences – largely due to historical reasons – have attracted the 
attention of social scientists since many decades ago (e.g. Banfield 1958; Bell 1979; 
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Putnam 1993). The analysis of these regional differences and of the Mezzogiorno’s 
cultural features was instrumental in the development of sociological concepts like 
amoral familism and social capital, the latter in particular being a dominant focus of 
contemporary socio-political research (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 
1995). Moreover, the Mezzogiorno’s socio-economic and cultural features suggest 
some parallelism with the Southern region of the US and its high violent crime rates 
(Baron and Straus 1988). In Italy, violent crimes and criminal organizations have been 
since centuries ago a characteristic of the more rural-agricultural Southern region; 
whereas the more developed and industrialized Northern region registered low violence 
level but higher property crime rates (Carbonaro 1954). We ask ourselves whether that 
traditional crime profile still survives in Italy and, in case of affirmative answer, how it 
coexists with social change.  
To start with, even traditional organized crime is not necessarily what it used to 
be. Social scientists noticed changes over time in the Mafia-type organizations. In 
particular, these organizations movement from their habitual Southern turf to the 
Central and Northern provinces, at least to invest the return of their illicit activities; the 
capability of adapting to new political situations and to new market conditions 
(Catanzaro 1985; Shelley 1994); the shift from extortions and violence towards more 
entrepreneurial – though still illegal or semi-illegal – businesses (Arlacchi 1986; Paoli 
2008), in particular that of “private protection” (Gambetta 1993); the decline in the 
social culture supporting these criminal organizations (Cayli 2013); and the foreign 
immigrants’ tendency to replace natives in organized crime (Paoli 2008).  
New social facts that emerged over the last decades are regarded as capable of 
changing nature and prevalence of traditional criminality. Hard drugs proliferation can 
be considered an indicator of anomie and of pressure to commit crimes: i.e. income-
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generating crimes to afford the costs of hard drugs; criminal conspiracies aimed at drug 
trafficking and control of the drug market; and homicides deriving from these illegal 
activities (among the massive literature on this subject, Goldstein 1985; Johnson et al. 
1991; Bean 2002). 
Among these new social facts, foreign immigration could have a prominent 
position. Studies in Europe’s large scale immigration countries – Germany, 
Switzerland, France, Belgium and England – during the 1950’s -1960’s had found that 
immigrant crime rates were inferior or similar to native rates. In addition, most studies 
conducted in larger immigration countries outside Europe (Canada, the United States 
and Australia) have negated higher crime rates among the immigrant population 
(Yeager 1996; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007; Francis 2014). Since the early 1980’s, 
however, several studies carried out in most of the West European countries have 
reached the conclusion that immigrants have been markedly over-represented in crime 
statistics (Tonry 1997a; Marshall 1997; Solivetti 2010).  The link between immigration 
and the abovementioned drug trafficking and criminal conspiracies has been 
emphasized (Paoli and Reuter 2008). The immigration-crime link has fuelled the most 
heated debate in the European political arena. Even among social scientists positions 
have been far apart, although the major criminological theories expect immigrants to 
exhibit higher crime rates.  
The social disorganization theory, originally a product of the Chicago School of 
Sociology, ascribed immigrant crime to the lack of cohesion and of social organization 
that – also due to immigrants’ mobility – characterized the urban sections where new 
immigrants tended to gather. This model has been used in various studies and different 
countries (Sampson and Groves 1989; Herzog 2009; Boggess and Hipp 2010). 
However, other studies contended that high crime levels could be found in areas 
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characterized by residential stability, as well as by ethnic homogeneity and 
concentrated disadvantage (Sampson and Wilson 1995). 
Several authors have followed Merton’s seminal study on anomie and relative 
deprivation (1949). It suggested that lower classes are driven to crime because – though 
influenced by the universal goal of economic success – they have scarce access to the 
legitimate means leading to such success. Since immigrants – who averagely present 
lower education, lower wages and higher unemployment – are lacking in legitimate 
opportunities, they could be more prone to crime (Basdevant 1983; Killias 1989; Hofer 
et al. 1997). Other authors have adopted the so called economic model of crime and, 
following the pioneering study of Becker (1968), suggested that crime is a rational 
choice whenever its benefit outweighs its cost. Costs and benefits, however, are 
relative, because one measures them against the legitimate opportunities available to 
him/her, and therefore – for reasons abovementioned – the average propensity to crime 
among the immigrants should be higher (Neumayer 2006; Vaillant and Dervaux 2008; 
Bell et al. 2010; Spenkuch 2014).  
A corollary of both the previous theories is that immigrants from countries with 
socio-economic conditions and skills markedly lower than those of the host society 
would tend to malintegration and norm-breaking (Eisenstadt 1954; Calavita 2005; 
Stowell 2007; Bovenkerk and Fokkema 2015). There are however exceptions: the so 
called Latino immigrant paradox in the US, namely low-crime ethnic groups from poor 
countries (Sampson 2008; Vaughn 2014), and South Asia’s immigrants in Europe 
(Killias 1989; Tonry 1997b).  
Apart from this, immigrants from socially and culturally distant societies could 
have serious problems of integration and culture conflict (Sellin 1938; Kühne 2002; 
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Reich 2006); and immigrants coming in particular from societies with high levels of 
illegality and crime could have interiorized both of them (Gurr 1989; Karstedt 2001). 
Moreover, in many countries, immigrant population is prevalently male and 
young. And since males in the so called crime-prone years make an over-proportional 
contribution to crime (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983), demographic reasons could 
contribute to immigrant crime. 
 Whatever the reason for immigrant crime, almost all the investigations focused 
on the immigrant share among people arrested or jailed. Investigations dealing with the 
territorial relation between immigration and crime were few and mainly based on US 
data. These facts are regrettable, because territorial analyses could clarify not only 
whether immigrants’ distribution coincides with crime distribution, but also whether 
there are territorial features having a greater influence on crime rates. Moreover, the 
results of the abovementioned investigations are far from being convergent. Reid et al., 
(2005), studying US urban data, found a significant immigration-crime link only with 
regard to robberies. Nielsen et al. (2005), using data on sections of two US urban areas, 
found that the immigration factor was of low significance. Comparable results had been 
reached by Butcher and Piehl (1998). In the US, again, Ousey and Kubrin found a 
negative relation between territorial variations of immigrants and crime rates (2009); 
whereas Spenkuch (2014) found a positive association between foreign-born variations 
and property crime. In Europe, the results of Entorf and Spengler’s study on Germany’s 
Länder (2000) showed a correlation between immigration and only theft and overall 
crime rates. Aoki and Todo (2009) found a low correlation between immigrants and 
overall crime in France’s departments, whereas Hooghe et al. (2011) found in 
Belgium’s municipalities a positive association between immigrants and thefts. 
Buonanno (2006), using Italian regional data, found a weak association between 
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immigrants and crime against property. Cracolici and Uberti (2009), using Italian 
provincial data, by contrast, found a strong association between immigrants’ 
distribution and both theft and fraud rates.  
Italy could represent an ideal case for examining in depth the territorial features 
associated with crime, as well as the immigration impact in a context of marked 
regional differences and traditional crime. Moreover, the migratory inflow in Italy has 
presented peculiar features compared with other Western countries. A country of 
emigration until the 1960’s, Italy has been characterized by a recent but tumultuous 
migratory flow, which has possibly posed difficulties for immigrant integration. The 
1995-2005 years were crucial for the development of this migratory flow, because the 
total foreign immigrant share in Italy soared in that period from 1.8% to 4.7% of the 
resident population. This in spite of the country’s high unemployment (averagely 
10.3%) and its poor score in economic freedom (Gwartney et al. 2013). The migratory 
flow included a substantial number of illegal immigrants – cyclically reabsorbed by ad 
hoc regularizations – whose condition is regarded as critical for crime control. Only 
few immigrants (13% in 2000), were from Western Europe, and more than 60% from 
non-Western, less developed countries. This – as mentioned above – could be relevant 
for malintegration and norm-breaking. Moreover, such a migratory flow has mainly 
concerned the Central and Northern regions, where development is definitely higher 
and where the adult immigrant share was, in the abovementioned period, 3.3 times that 
in Southern Italy. All this prompts a few questions. Has this migratory flow impacted 
on crime figures, at least in the Central and Northern provinces? Have immigrants 
superseded native Mafia-type criminal organizations? And is the immigration impact 
on crime larger in a country where immigration has been a new phenomenon and its 
growth feverish? 
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2. Layout of the Present Study 
The present analysis has focused on the 103 Italian provinces (pre-2001 boundaries). 
Each territorial unit comprises on average 2,900 sq. km and 550,000 people (2001). We 
chose a series of offences to represent crime. For reasons that will be clearer later, we 
avoided using groupings like “property crime” or “violent crime”. Instead, we 
considered firstly some of the most serious offences, intentional homicide, rape, 
robbery, extortion, and criminal conspiracy (i.e. the offence of membership of an 
association to commit crime), followed by exploitation of prostitution, an offence often 
perpetrated by transnational criminal organizations and accompanied by violence 
against persons, then the most common offence, theft, and at last, overall crime, namely 
the total number of criminal offences, also known as index of criminality. All crime 
rates are averages from 1995 to 2005. 
We used four control/explicative variables in all the regression models: male 
population aged 15 to 24 years, chief town population, per capita GDP, and male 
unemployment. Those variables were chosen for the following reasons. The male 
population aged 15 to 24 can be expedient to control for the crime-prone years and for 
the abovementioned demographic differences between immigrant and native 
populations. However, one must remember that male population aged 15 to 24 years is 
also intertwined with male unemployment (r = .82) and GDP per capita (−.80). The 
degree of urbanization was (Levi 1880) and still is (Dijk et al. 2007) the single best 
predictor of crime. Concurrently, in all the host countries immigrants tend to 
concentrate in urban areas (OECD 2004). Therefore, the presence of urban areas could 
cause spurious correlations between crime and explicative variables. In terms of 
urbanization degree, additionally, Italian provinces encompass a broad spectrum, from 
quasi-rural conditions (chief town population ~ 20,000), to cities of more than 
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2,500,000 population. To measure the urbanization degree, we considered population 
per sq. km: this indicator however is distorted by the presence of provinces with 
extended mountain areas. The size of the chief town population, instead, is not affected 
by this feature; moreover, it captures the presence of big cities, particularly associated 
with high theft and robbery rates. Male unemployment in turn is regarded as 
particularly momentous by authors adopting the economic model of crime or the 
anomie approach. Male unemployment could be relevant in Italy also because its 
variance over the territory is huge and its maximum values are impressive (Appendix, 
I). This variable is closely correlated with per capita GDP (−.83), which is a measure of 
absolute economic status. Therefore, any assumption about the contribution to a social 
fact made by high unemployment should also consider the contribution made by low 
GDP, and vice-versa.  
In addition to these controls, we used several explicative variables. Among 
them, an estimated income concentration index (Solivetti 2013), correlated with GDP 
(−.65); then variables relating to the distribution of workers over the main economic 
sectors (Reid et al. 2005). Plus the share of professionals & entrepreneurs1
                                                          
1 A census category: “professionals” are people in white-collar professional occupations; 
“entrepreneurs”, people who organize and manage a company.  
 among 
employed population (a proxy for affluence). In order to measure education, we used 
the percent of graduate population. We expected a higher educational level to be both a 
sign of commitment to positive social goals and a factor increasing the returns to 
legitimate work, as well as the costs of recurring to crime (Hirschi 1969; Gottfredson 
1985; Machin et al. 2010). However, because Guerry (1833) had already discovered 
that – at least in macro-level analyses – the association between level of education and 
crime against both persons and property could be positive rather than negative, and 
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since also recent empirical evidences of this association are not conclusive, we 
considered in addition the share of those who did not comply with compulsory 
education. This variable, apart from being an indicator of poor education, could 
constitute also an indicator of loose social fabric. The percentage of people separated or 
divorced could represent a further indicator of social malaise, and specifically of family 
disruption (Ousey and Kubrin 2009). In turn, infant mortality – a variable whose high 
values are usually associated with lower education – could be a proxy of wide-ranging 
backwardness. Next, we regarded deaths due to drug abuse as a reasonable proxy of 
hard drug prevalence. We took into consideration, as well, some variables meant to 
measure the level of social capital. Newspapers circulation, originally suggested as a 
measure of social capital by Putnam (1993), proved to be very highly correlated with 
chief town population (.92) and instead uncorrelated with both education and offences 
such as criminal conspiracy and Mafia-type organizations,2 which in turn should 
represent indirect indicators of, respectively, high and low levels of social capital. On 
the basis of these results, in lieu of newspapers circulation we used the circulation of 
the leading general interest magazines.3
                                                          
2 The diffusion of Mafia-type criminal organizations was measured by the rate of people charged with 
membership of such organizations. 
 Magazines circulation proved to be 
uncorrelated with urbanization degree and instead highly correlated with education and 
the other abovementioned indirect indicators of social capital. The share of voters who 
took part in the 2001 referendum could be tantamount to a further measure of social 
capital (Putnam 1993). Share of voters and magazines circulation emerged as closely 
correlated.  
3 These magazines are Panorama, L’Espresso and Il Mondo. 
10 
 
Changes of residence (people moving into the province from any previous 
national or foreign locality) would measure the impact on crime of residential 
instability, and would indirectly check the tenets of the social disorganization theory. 
The correlation between residential instability and immigrant share is close (.67), but 
not such as to hinder comparison between their effects. A high share of homes occupied 
by their owners could in some way reduce the adverse social impact of residential 
instability and high urbanization level. To avoid distortions due to the uneven 
distribution over the territory of holiday houses, however, we calculated owner-
occupied homes as a share of only houses occupied by residents. In order to measure 
the important foreign immigration topic, we made use of various indicators: the adult 
foreign immigrant share on resident population (1995 to 2005), adult illegal immigrants 
(calculated on the 2002-2004 regularization), share of the adult male immigrants 
belonging to the six national groups with the highest impact on overall crime, which are 
all from non-Western countries,4
The direct indicators of immigrant presence (first, adult immigrants and adult 
illegal immigrants), however, are imprecise. Not all the illegal immigrants are captured 
by the variable bearing this name, which is based on regularizations. Not all the legal 
immigrants are residing where they were registered: a share of them moved back to 
their country of origin. An indirect indicator, i.e. migrant remittances to the country of 
origin, would capture the immigrants, both legal and illegal, actually residing in the 
host country. Though the use of remittances is not uniform among immigrants (Carling 
2008), it seems reasonable to employ remittances as a measure of immigrant population 
 and, last, underage immigrants (an indicator of 
radication). All these indicators are intercorrelated (r = .41 to .81). 
                                                          
4 The selection of these groups of immigrants was based on the number of people charged with criminal 
offences (abs. val.). The countries these groups have come from are Morocco, Albania, Romania, 
Senegal, former Yugoslavia and Tunisia.  
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(Passel 2007). We discovered that remittances are significantly correlated with both 
legal and illegal immigrants (r = .43 and .38): and the correlation is closer in the 
Central-Northern provinces (.59 and .50). Therefore, we used all remittances, as a share 
of the province’s GDP, as the main indicator of immigrant population. We assume that 
remittances do not directly cause crime; besides, crime rates should not affect 
remittances, because the revenues of income-generating crime would hardly be 
channelled through a certified procedure registering both the sender and the receiver. 
However, we cannot exclude a correlation between remittances and the disturbance of 
the endogenous variable. To check this, we introduced an instrument for the immigrant 
presence: the remittances sent by immigrants in 1994. Because new immigrants tend to 
follow in old immigrants’ footsteps, these remittances are correlated with later 
immigration indicators (1995-2005). In particular, remittances of 1994 are significantly 
correlated with later legal and illegal immigrant indicators, though not with underage 
immigrants and high-crime national groups of immigrants. Concurrently, remittances of 
1994 cannot directly cause crime of 1995-2005; and the latter cannot cause previous 
remittances. Ultimately, 1994 remittances – being also a lagged variable – would be 
particularly helpful to distinguish between correlation and causality. 
The period covered by the analysis is 1995 to 2005, exceptions being 
represented mainly by census data (2001) and by variables relating to sporadic events 
such as referendums and regularizations of illegal immigrants. The potential relevance 
of these variables, however, dissuaded us from conducting a longitudinal analysis. 
Therefore, we made recourse to a cross-sectional analysis of the territorial units, by 
means of multiple linear regressions and spatial regression models. Each model 
contains the same control variables, plus the explicative variables generating the best 
statistical results. 
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3. Results 
The descriptive statistics show (Appendix) that crime rates are often widely 
differentiated over the territory and in particular the high frequency of homicides, 
extortions and criminal conspiracies in some parts of the country is not something 
belonging only to the past. The statistical analysis in turn revealed a close linear 
association between the homicide distribution and male unemployment, compulsory 
education avoidance, Mafia-type organizations, male population aged 15 to 24 years, 
infant mortality, income maldistribution and “South”. Moreover, homicides are 
negatively associated with per capita GDP, the share of people employed in the 
manufacturing sector, and social capital, as measured by magazines circulation and 
referendum voters. Also residential instability is negatively associated with homicides; 
and the same happens with drug abuse. In addition, homicides are negatively associated 
with all the main indicators of foreign immigration. The urbanization degree, in turn, is 
not statistically significant. The multiple regression models, incorporating all the 
controls and using conservative error estimations5
                                                          
5 All the regression models used “robust” error estimations to control for errors heteroscedasticity, via the 
Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance. 
 (Table 1), show in particular the 
contribution to homicide rates made by the combination of male unemployment, 
compulsory education avoidance, income maldistribution and traditional criminal 
organizations. Therefore, homicide is rife where there is underdevelopment, 
unemployment, limited education and limited social capital. In such a picture, foreign 
immigrants are relatively few, because they are attracted by the richer, developed and 
often more urbanized areas: adult immigrants are correlated with per capita GDP (r = 
.80), unemployment (−.66), chief town population (.32) and also Mafia-type 
organizations (−.48). 
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Table 1 Multiple linear regression models: crime rates of all the Italian provinces, and variables relating to features of the abovementioned provinces; semi-
logarithmic models, coefficients, “robust” errors estimation, and VIF;1
Independent/control variables  
 Moran’s “I” 
(abbr. labels) 
Intentional 
Homicide 
Criminal 
conspiracy Extortion Robbery Theft Rape 
Exploitation of 
prostitution 
Overall 
crime 
Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. 
Population                 
Male population aged 15 to 24 years 0.213 0.130 -0.212 0.115 -0.062 0.069 0.003 0.091 0.031 0.061 0.042 0.062 -0.362 0.100 -0.058 0.043 
Chief town population -0.099 0.073 0.190 0.075 0.131 0.062 0.525 0.062 0.259 0.033 0.067 0.031 0.373 0.098 0.146 0.030 
Residential instability   -0.265 0.132     0.151 0.059       
Migrant remittances 1.397 1.069 -0.267 1.077 0.730 0.878 -0.245 1.099 1.407 0.630 0.769 0.619 1.653 1.366 1.199 0.550 
Underage immigrants               -0.015 0.007 
Separated or divorced people 0.180 0.042       0.046 0.025 0.078 0.018   0.028 0.020 
Economics                 
GDP per capita (,000) -0.041 0.027 0.021 0.032 -0.043 0.022 -0.009 0.022 -0.042 0.015 -0.009 0.013 -0.028 0.031 -0.011 0.013 
Income concentration 3.060 1.419 -3.900 1.690   0.680 1.084         
Owner-occupied homes           0.015 0.007     
Unemployed, males >=15 year old 0.029 0.022 0.010 0.022 -0.007 0.019 -0.004 0.019 -0.018 0.009 0.006 0.008 -0.031 0.025 -0.008 0.008 
Professionals & entrepreneurs             -0.122 0.080   
Social capital & culture                 
Compulsory education avoidance 0.135 0.056 -0.070 0.049   0.149 0.043         
Voters, 2001 referendum     -0.016 0.008         -0.013 0.005 
Illegal & deviant context                 
Deaths due to drug abuse       0.142 0.077 0.076 0.060   0.247 0.121 0.073 0.041 
Mafia-type organizations 0.393 0.166 0.844 0.215 0.383 0.226           
"South" (dummy)   0.627 0.262 0.406 0.144           
Constant -1.537 1.153 0.462 1.077 2.319 0.674 -3.012 0.731 4.500 0.402 -0.689 0.797 -0.609 0.845 7.635 0.372 
R2 0.667 0.407 0.692 0.681 0.664 0.342 0.496 0.561 
VIF (ave. value) 4.98 4.56 4.66 3.51 4.52 4.41 3.75 4.79 
N 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
Moran’s “I” for non-log. dep. var. (z) 13.91 2.10 7.33 2.34 1.44 18.47 8.16 0.849 
                                                          
1 It calculates the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the independent variables and looks for multicollinearity amongst them 
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Fig 1 Hot spots for the territorial distributions of intentional homicides, male 
unemployment, Mafia-type organizations and compulsory education avoidance, in all 
the provinces of Italy. (Stata graphics) 
 
The homicide rate distribution reveals a marked positive spatial autocorrelation, 
as measured by the Moran’s “I”1
                                                          
1 For the Moran’s I – the measure of 
 (Table 1). It means that provinces with high homicide 
rates are close to each other. Concurrently, the main predictors of homicide rates 
(unemployment, compulsory education avoidance, Mafia-type organizations, male 
population aged 15 to 24 years, infant mortality, income maldistribution, magazines 
circulation and referendum voters) all are characterized by a high spatial 
autocorrelation, with Moran’s “I” z values from a minimum of 15 to a maximum of 26. 
spatial autocorrelation developed by P. A. P. Moran – a proximity 
weights matrix, based on the inverse distance between the provinces centroids, was used. Software: 
Stata modules Spatwmat, Spatgsa by M. Pisati and Spwmatrix, Splagvar by P. W. Jeanty.  
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Figure 1 better qualifies all this. Its “hot spots”2
Moreover, by using a spatial regression model, it was possible to discover that 
some of the homicide predictors are spatially correlated: i.e. the homicide rate in each 
province is affected not only by the independent variables values registered in that 
province but also by the values of the same variables in the surrounding provinces. In 
particular, the spatial regressions show that the values for compulsory education 
avoidance and Mafia-type organizations in the neighbour provinces significantly 
improve the model fit (Table 2).
 (Ord and Getis, 1995) graphically 
identify provinces that have high homicide rates – compared with the global average – 
and are at the same time surrounded by other provinces with high homicide rates. 
Figure 1 clearly shows that conspicuous hot spots substantially occur only in the 
Southern provinces. What is more, also compulsory education avoidance, Mafia-type 
organizations and male unemployment present hot spots only in the Southern provinces 
and largely overlapping with the homicide ones. One partial exception is represented by 
Sardinia, where Mafia-type organizations are notably absent. 
3
Homicide is territorially correlated with other serious criminal offences, namely 
criminal conspiracy and extortion, and the correlation with the latter is close (.67). 
Criminal conspiracies and extortions are in turn correlated with “South” too. These 
offences show also a marked positive spatial autocorrelation: that for extortions is even 
higher than that shown by homicides. The backgrounds of these two criminal offences 
 All these results suggest criminal contagion at the 
territorial level. 
                                                          
2 For the hot spot analysis, a binary weights matrix, based on the provinces queen contiguity, was used. 
Software: Stata modules Spmat, by D. M. Drukker and Spmap, by M. Pisati. 
3 The spatial regression models used a row-standardized weights matrix, based on the inverse distance 
between the provinces centroids. Software: Stata modules Spatwmat, Spatreg by M. Pisati, and Spmlreg 
by P. W. Jeanty. By using spatial data, one violates the ordinary least squares regression assumption 
that regressors are linearly independent. Therefore, we used maximum likelihood models, which leave 
out of consideration such assumption. 
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are very similar to that of homicide. Both offences are associated with limited 
development and socio-cultural decay. Mafia-type organizations seem to play a 
relevant role in the distribution of these offences. The same thing occurs with social 
capital indicators. In particular, the full regression models show that fewer referendum 
voters predict higher extortion rates (Table 1). In turn, the various foreign immigration 
indicators, as well as residential instability, all play a negative or non-significant role in 
the distribution of extortions and criminal conspiracies. Apart from these similarities in 
the distributions of homicides, extortions and criminal conspiracies, there is something 
else regarding the relationship between these offences. If we analyse together the 
regression models for intentional homicides and extortions by means of a SUR 
(seemingly unrelated regression), we find that this technique yields a better conjoint 
estimation of the regressors (Table 3). Therefore, not only are homicides and extortions 
similarly distributed on the territory; but their regression models are intercorrelated via 
their residuals. This further confirms the relationship between these offences.  
 
Table 2 Comparison between ordinary and spatial multiple regression models (OLS and ML): 
intentional homicide rates of all the Italian provinces, and two main variables relating to 
features of the abovementioned provinces; semi-logarithmic models, coefficients, “robust” 
errors estimation, rho and Akaike’s Information Criterion 
Independent/control variables  
(abbr. labels) 
Intentional 
homicide (OLS) 
Intentional 
homicide (ML) 
Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. 
Social capital & culture     
Compulsory education avoidance 0.100 0.025 0.061 0.025 
Illegal & deviant context     
Mafia-type organizations 0.276 0.115 0.205 0.084 
Constant −0.478 0.257 −0.512 0.246 
R2 (pseudo-R2) 0.400 (0.471) 
Rho   4.93 0.000 
AIC 187.0 180.8 
N 103 103 
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Table 3 SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) models: homicides and extortions rates of all 
the Italian provinces, and variables relating to features of the abovementioned provinces; semi-
logarithmic models, coefficients and “robust” errors estimation 
Independent/control variables  
(abbr. labels) 
Intentional 
homicide 
Extortion 
Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. 
Population     
Male population aged 15 to 24 years 0.155 0.126 -0.064 0.073 
Chief town population -0.094 0.069 0.128 0.053 
Migrant remittances 1.240 1.353 0.754 1.012 
Separated or divorced people 0.158 0.037   
Economics     
GDP per capita (,000) -0.034 0.026 -0.043 0.021 
Income concentration 3.258 1.467   
Unemployed, males >=15 year old 0.032 0.025 -0.007 0.016 
Social capital & culture     
Compulsory education avoidance 0.149 0.049   
Voters, 2001 referendum   -0.015 0.007 
Illegal & deviant context     
Mafia-type organizations 0.360 0.219 0.382 0.153 
South (dummy)   0.427 0.156 
Constant -1.324 1.067 2.305 0.652 
“R2” 0.666 0.692 
N 103 103 
Correlation of residuals: 
 
0.380 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence:               chi2 = 14.835         Prob. = 0.000 
 
 
With regard to robbery, we found that this crime is correlated with some 
indicators of social malaise (Mafia-type organizations included) already characterizing 
the previous offences. However, robberies distribution is first of all distinguished by an 
extremely high association with urban areas. In a nutshell, high robbery rates are 
registered in deprived urban centres like Naples, Palermo, and Catania. The full 
regression model emphasizes, apart from urban areas, the contribution of compulsory 
education avoidance and drug abuse; remittances are correlated with robbery but they 
do not reach statistical significance in the full model (Table 1).  
Also the theft distribution presents close correlations with the urbanization 
degree indicators. However, the similarities stop here. When we shift focus to theft, the 
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correlations with “South” and Mafia-type organizations – positive for all the previous 
offences – become negative; whereas all the development and social capital indicators – 
from income to education, from magazines circulation to referendum voters – change 
their correlation signs from negative to positive. Theft is significantly correlated also 
with all the main indicators of immigration. Besides, theft is closely correlated with 
deaths due to drug abuse. The theft-unemployment relationship instead is negative. 
This is due to the already mentioned underlying link between income and employment. 
If we regress thefts controlling for income differences, unemployment becomes 
positively associated with thefts and both income and unemployment are significant. 
Therefore, income doesn’t seem to affect the motivational factors for theft (greater 
income = lesser interest in stealing), but it seems to affect theft opportunities (greater 
income = more goods that can be stolen); whereas, controlling for income, 
unemployment affects theft motivations. In the full regression models, we find that 
thefts are significantly predicted by chief town population, residential instability and 
remittances (Table 1). Last, the territorial distribution of thefts shows a relatively low 
spatial autocorrelation when compared to the levels found for homicides, extortions and 
criminal conspiracies. 
Rape, in spite of being a crime against persons and therefore analogous to 
homicide, shows a territorial distribution similar to theft, namely a crime against 
property. Rapes are positively correlated with urban areas, income, education, 
magazines circulation, people separated or divorced, and the Central-Northern 
provinces. Moreover, rapes are correlated with drug abuse and remittances; whereas 
their correlation with Mafia-type organizations is non-significant. In the full regression 
models (Table 1), the contributions in particular of “separated or divorced people” and 
of owner-occupied homes emerge. All in all, rapes are associated with a context of 
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material wellbeing, urban areas and education, where also deviant behaviour (drug 
abuse) and marital anomie are rife.  
The cases of exploitation of prostitution present a pattern of territorial 
distribution similar to that of rape. The exploitation of prostitution is correlated with the 
Central and Northern provinces, urban areas, a higher and better distributed income, 
higher education, the social capital indicators, professionals/entrepreneurs, limited 
juvenile population (which is equivalent to low birth rate), separations & divorces, and 
drug abuse; it is also significantly correlated with all the foreign immigration 
indicators, whereas the correlation with Mafia-type organizations is negative. This 
picture should not be surprising. The offence of exploitation implies the activity of 
prostitution (which is not itself a crime in Italy), and in turn prostitution needs clients, 
who on average are more numerous where economic wellbeing is profuse and the scope 
for non-conformist or deviant behaviour larger. The full regression models (Table 1) 
emphasize the contribution given by urban areas, population features, and illegal drug 
abuse, whereas the foreign immigration indicators lose their statistical significance.  
The overall crime rate shows a distribution bearing a similarity to the theft 
distribution pattern. This result was predictable, because thefts represent approximately 
half of the total recorded crime. The full regression models confirm inter alia the 
relevance of urban areas, migrant remittances and drug abuse (Table 1).  
At this point, it is opportune to check whether the results obtained from the 
analysis of all the provinces are at variance with the results relating to the sole 
provinces of Central and Northern Italy, where the immigrant share is much higher. 
Indeed, in the Central-Northern provinces the role of social capital in predicting crime 
is markedly smaller. When the main controls are included, magazines circulation and 
compulsory education avoidance are never significant; referendum voters are 
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associated with lower overall crime (Table 4). Instead, other variables become 
definitely relevant in the Central-Northern provinces. The urbanization level is 
positively correlated with all the offences and even in the full regression models its 
contribution is particularly significant in the cases of robbery, theft, exploitation of 
prostitution, and overall crime. However, the share of owner-occupied homes seems to 
compensate for the adverse role played by urban areas, also when controlling for 
residential instability. Male population 15 to 24 year old becomes negatively correlated 
with all the crime rates and remains either negative or non-significant in the full 
regression models. Deaths due to drug abuse, when used as single regressor, 
significantly predict all the eight crime rates; when we control for urban areas, their 
contribution to crime rate prediction decreases, but it is still significant. However, in the 
full regression models, drug abuse statistical contribution to crime decreases to the 
benefit of the immigration significance.  
When we move from all the provinces to the Central-Northern ones only, the 
migrant remittances indicator is correlated with all the eight offences. Even in the full 
regression models and in spite of conservative error estimations, remittances are 
significantly predicting homicide, rape, theft, and overall crime (Table 4). The illegal 
immigration indicator is particularly correlated with theft and robbery and, in the 
robbery full model, it is a better predictor than remittances. In the case of theft, both 
remittances and illegal immigrants are associated with this offence not only directly but 
also indirectly, by means of  their correlation with drug abuse: the latter, acting as 
mediator, enhances the immigration-theft link (Figure 2). The six non-Western national 
groups with the highest impact on overall crime are particularly relevant for criminal 
conspiracy and exploitation of prostitution. The latter two offences are correlated, 
forming therefore, together with immigration, a criminal triangle.  
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Table 4 Multiple linear regression models: crime rates of all provinces belonging to the regions of Central and Northern Italy, and variables relating to 
features of the abovementioned provinces; semi-logarithmic models, coefficients, “robust” errors estimation, and VIF; Moran’s “I” 
Independent/control variables  
(abbr. labels) 
Intentional 
Homicide 
Criminal 
conspiracy Extortion Robbery Theft Rape 
Exploitation of 
prostitution 
Overall 
crime 
Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. 
Population                 
Male population aged 15 to 24 years 0.064 0.185 -0.054 0.127 -0.101 0.087 0.012 0.101 -0.157 0.081 -0.049 0.102 -0.393 0.121 -0.023 0.064 
Chief town population 0.047 0.111 0.079 0.133 0.071 0.067 0.377 0.102 0.233 0.065 0.020 0.040 0.360 0.125 0.100 0.047 
Migrant remittances 2.947 1.282 -0.423 1.459 1.471 0.995 -0.633 1.053 2.781 0.754 1.729 0.834 1.364 1.347 2.238 0.753 
Illegal immigrants       0.231 0.077         
High-crime nat. groups of immigrants   0.547 0.195         0.476 0.218   
Underage immigrants         -0.049 0.015 -0.015 0.018   -0.038 0.011 
Separated or divorced people 0.212 0.051         0.053 0.026     
Economics                 
GDP per capita (,000) -0.064 0.042 0.033 0.037 -0.032 0.024 -0.005 0.032 0.013 0.018 0.011 0.021 -0.027 0.042 -0.026 0.017 
Income concentration       1.765 2.038 6.175 2.134   9.044 4.920   
Owner-occupied homes               -0.019 0.008 
Unemployed, males >=15 year old -0.031 0.060 0.130 0.051 0.003 0.031 -0.003 0.043 -0.033 0.030 0.006 0.022 -0.025 0.061 -0.014 0.023 
Social capital & culture                 
Graduate population         -0.202 0.049   -0.187 0.110   
General interest magazines circulation -0.034 0.025         -0.010 0.008     
Voters, 2001 referendum     -0.013 0.009       -0.021 0.010   
Illegal & deviant context                 
Deaths due to drug abuse   0.088 0.095 0.073 0.065 0.181 0.085 0.152 0.062   0.143 0.124 0.071 0.059 
Mafia-type organizations   -0.158 1.185 -0.047 0.784           
Constant -0.245 1.563 -2.246 1.403 2.688 0.827 1.797 0.993 6.166 0.709 1.699 1.063 -1.524 1.301 9.812 0.800 
R2 0.382 0.235 0.245 0.676 0.670 0.421 0.441 0.632 
VIF (ave. val.)  2.81 2.02 2.14 2.27 3.35 3.05 3.16 2.30 
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 
Moran’s “I” for non-log. dep. var. (z) 1.49 1.22 2.22 0.05 0.65 4.78 1.99 0.85 
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Fig 2 Direct and indirect effects between adult illegal immigrants, deaths due to drug abuse, 
and thefts. Mediation model, Structural Equation. Estimation method: maximum likelihood. 
Coefficients and (“robust” errors). All the provinces belonging to the regions of Central and 
Northern Italy. (Stata graphics) 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Deviations from the median for the territorial distributions of robberies, illegal 
immigrants, deaths due to drug abuse and chief town population, in the Central and 
Northern provinces of Italy. (Stata graphics) 
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In turn, the underage immigrant share is negatively correlated with most crimes.  
The relevance of foreign immigration is detrimental to the relevance of traditional 
criminal organizations. The statistical contribution made by Mafia-type organizations to 
the most serious crimes, like homicides, extortions and criminal conspiracies, seems to 
evaporate in the Central-Northern provinces. In particular, with regard to criminal 
conspiracy, its very close correlation with Mafia-type organizations disappears, 
whereas foreign immigration becomes its main predictor (Table 4). 
For both thefts and robberies, male unemployment ceases to have any 
significant impact when immigrant share (and urbanization degree) are included in the 
model. The same occurs for homicides. 
The case of robberies can epitomize the differences between the two territorial 
contexts. Moving from all the provinces to the Central and Northern ones only, 
robberies are still associated with urban areas; but their territorial association with 
economic, social and educational backwardness (typical of some disadvantaged large 
cities of the Mezzogiorno, such as Naples) disappears. In the Central-Northern 
provinces, robberies are associated, apart from urbanization degree, with both 
remittances and illegal immigrants and with drug abuse (Figure 3).  
Since immigration plays a key role with regard to crime, especially in the 
Northern-Central provinces, the immigration indicators endogeneity could be a relevant 
problem. To check this, we ran a two-stage model for the indicator summarizing crime, 
i.e. “overall crime”, using remittances of 1994 as an instrument for remittances of 
1995-2005. The LIML1
                                                          
1 The Limited Information Maximum Likelihood model estimation is robust even with relatively weak 
instruments and small samples and therefore is better than the 2SLS and GMM estimations. 
 model (Table 5) shows that the instrument coefficients are 
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close to those of the instrumented indicator in the OLS model (Table 4: overall crime);2
Last, a fact characterizing the Central and Northern provinces is that the spatial 
autocorrelation level is low for substantially all the crimes (Table 4). Concurrently, the 
main predictors of crime present a low, non-significant spatial autocorrelation level. 
The Moran’s “I” z values for adult immigrants, remittances and deaths due to drug 
abuse fall in the range between 0.7 and 1.5; the z value for chief town population is 
negative. 
 
endogeneity test statistics are non-significant, so we cannot reject the null of exogeneity 
and we can continue to treat remittances of 1995-2005 as exogenous. We obtain 
analogous results using 1994 remittances as an instrument for later illegal immigrants, 
though the coefficients are less close (Table 5), whereas in the case of the legal 
immigrant indicator the results (not shown) hint at some endogeneity. For this reason, 
we did not use the latter indicator in the regression models. Since remittances are not 
correlated with high-crime national groups of immigrants (used e.g. in the OSL model 
for criminal conspiracy), we had to resort to a different instrument: i.e. a lagged 
variable (1994) concerning the same groups. On the basis of the results of the two-stage 
model (not shown), we cannot reject the null of exogeneity, though the margins are 
narrow. All this seems to support the value of the OLS models and in particular the 
choice of remittances as the main immigration indicator. Moreover, the significant 
results obtained by using lagged variables, such as 1994 remittances, suggest that the 
immigration-crime link is causal and unidirectional, not just the effect of spurious 
synchronic associations or reciprocal influences. 
                                                          
2 And, controlling for remittances 1995-2005, the instrument doesn't affect Y (exclusion restriction).  
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Table 5 Two-stage LIML models: crime rates of all provinces belonging to the regions of Central and Northern Italy, and variables relating to features of the 
abovementioned provinces; semi-logarithmic models, coefficients, “robust” errors estimation, and VIF; F values and test of endogeneity 
Independent/control variables  
(abbr. labels) 
Overall crime 
(Migr. remittances 1995-2005 = Migr. remittances 1994) 
 Overall crime 
(Illegal immigrants 2002-2004 = Migr. remittances 1994) 
First-stage Second-stage  First-stage Second-stage 
Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E.  Coeff. R.S.E. Coeff. R.S.E. 
Population          
Male population aged 15 to 24 years 0.001 0.008 -0.022 0.060  -0.184 0.143 0.034 0.061 
Chief town population  0.019 0.008 0.091 0.050  0.340 0.099 0.041 0.068 
Migrant remittances 1995-2005   2.605 0.854      
Migrant remittances 1994 1.778 0.279    15.641 6.117   
Illegal immigrants        0.296 0.127 
Underage immigrants 0.001 0.001 -0.039 0.011  0.089 0.030 -0.061 0.015 
Economics          
GDP per capita (,000) 0.001 0.002 -0.027 0.016  -0.028 0.035 -0.018 0.016 
Owner-occupied homes -0.001 0.001 -0.019 0.007  0.047 0.022 -0.035 0.009 
Unemployed, males >=15 year old 0.006 0.004 -0.018 0.023  -0.052 0.050 0.014 0.021 
Illegal & deviant context          
Deaths due to drug abuse -0.005 0.005 0.074 0.057  0.070 0.099 0.041 0.048 
Constant -0.203 0.119 9.986 0.743  -6.305 2.111 11.326 1.149 
Centred R2 0.711 0.630  0.511 0.604 
VIF (ave. val.) 2.17   2.17  
N 67 67  67 67 
Robust F (p.) 40.727 (0.000)   6.538 (0.013)  
Tests of endogeneity (H0: var. is exog.):      
Robust score chi2 (p.)  0.280 (0.597)   1.643 (0.200) 
 
 
 
26 
 
4. Discussion 
The territorial distribution of crime emerging from the Italian provinces can be 
summarized by two discrete pictures. A first set of crimes – intentional homicide, 
extortion, criminal conspiracy and, to a lesser degree, robbery – are associated with 
economic and educational backwardness, male unemployment and limited social 
capital, as well as with the presence of Mafia-type organizations. Against the often 
uncritically received drug-crime link, the results show also a negative association 
between drug abuse and both homicides and extortions. Besides, contrary to the 
expectations of old and new theories of social disorganization focusing on the harmful 
effects of population mobility, homicides, extortions, criminal conspiracies and Mafia-
type organizations are all negatively associated with both residential instability and 
foreign immigration. This suggests that such criminal facts can be generated by a static 
background rather than by a dynamic one; by a criminogenic localism rather than by 
imported sources of conflict. In other words, they can be generated by a context in 
which the negative effects of backwardness are not compensated by gemeinschaft 
bonds – as many would expect – but rather exacerbated by inadequate social capital.  
By contrast, a second set of crimes, namely theft and overall crime as well as 
rape and exploitation of prostitution, more widespread in the Central-Northern 
provinces, are associated with a background of material wellbeing (with the attendant 
availability of costly illegal drugs), education and, generally speaking, of development. 
In particular, higher wealth levels seem to increase theft opportunities, whereas the 
inclination to steal seems to be encouraged by relatively higher unemployment. 
If we exclude the Southern provinces and analyse only the Central-Northern 
ones, a different picture emerges. The regression models indicate that the associations 
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between the level of social capital and the various crimes are modest. Instead, other 
factors seem to assume in these provinces a relevant role. One of them is certainly the 
degree of urbanization. Also illegal drug abuse – which can be regarded as a "modern" 
social phenomenon – is positively associated with crime rates. Moreover, foreign 
immigration emerges as a superior predictor of the frequency of most crimes. The 
results for the Central and Northern provinces show that, among the most serious or 
most common crimes taken into account, only extortions are not significantly 
associated with immigration. A high share of illegal immigrants – i.e. of those 
immigrants averagely in worse socio-economic conditions – plays a particularly 
significant role in predicting theft and robbery. This fact, and the negative association 
between crime rates and underage immigrants, evoke the possibility that a better 
integration of the immigrants in the host society could contain crime rates.  
However, with regard to unemployment – a variable usually considered as a 
measure of material opportunities and legitimate means – the present research results 
are ambivalent. When the analysis takes into account all the provinces, male 
unemployment predicts – at the single regression level – homicides, extortions, and 
criminal conspiracies. It predicts also thefts, when controlling for income. When the 
analysis focuses on the Central-Northern provinces, where the immigrant presence is 
conspicuous, the significance of male unemployment disappears, once the immigrant 
share is included in the model. This doesn’t seem to corroborate the hypothesis of a link 
between legitimate opportunities and crime, which is dear to the economic model of 
crime and the relative deprivation model. One could argue that the present results 
indirectly confirm these models, because, though unemployment is non-significant, 
foreign immigrants are ultimately on average in worse economic conditions than 
national citizens. However, one should inevitably admit that even so the crime 
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determinant would not be “lower economic conditions” as rather “immigrants’ lower 
economic conditions”. With regard to non-material aspects, the present results do not 
support culture conflict as the key crime factor. Foreign immigration is associated also 
with prosaic offences – theft, robbery, criminal conspiracy – that seem far away from 
any culture conflict. However, the fact that all the high-crime national groups come 
from countries socially and culturally distant and with averagely poor legality records 
suggest that also these aspects could promote crime.  
 In the Central and Northern provinces, the associations between the most 
serious crimes and Mafia-type organizations are non-significant. Therefore, the much-
feared penetration of such organizations into these provinces has not been accompanied 
by crimes associated with them in the Southern provinces. The present data cannot tell 
us whether this result is due to these organizations lack of radication in a context far 
from their breeding ground, or to the more entrepreneurial role they play in the Central-
Northern provinces. A role advising against criminal actions capable of drawing 
attention to the investment and recycling activities they run there. Anyway, the 
concurrent association, in these provinces, between immigration and most of the 
offences suggests that immigrant crime developed in lieu of traditional, native 
criminality. Moreover, the relationship between immigration, criminal conspiracy, 
illegal drug diffusion and exploitation of prostitution seems of particular relevance to 
organized crime. The hypothesis that a new criminality has reduced the space available 
for the old one cannot be excluded.  
The proliferation of thefts, rapes and exploitation of prostitution in the Central-
Northern provinces, where the presence of Mafia-type organizations is marginal, and, 
concurrently, the scarcity of these offences in the Southern provinces, where these 
organizations seem to be still rampant, prompt a question. Do such criminal 
29 
 
organizations exert a control on common offences and immigrant crime, and even on 
immorality and deviance? Are ultimately extortions only the price of protection and 
homicides the regrettable consequence of competition between protectors, as some 
“Godfather” would boast? The present analysis has shown that the high frequency of 
some crimes is better predicted by aspects other than the lack of Mafia-type 
organizations. Thefts are better predicted by the amount of goods that can be stolen; 
exploitation of the prostitution, by urban areas and wealth; even immigrant flows are 
better predicted by affluence and job opportunities than by the absence of traditional 
criminal organizations. Robberies provide the acid test of all this. Any control exerted 
by Mafia-type organizations should begin by curbing this grievous street crime. On the 
contrary, the highest robbery frequencies are recorded in provinces – Naples, Palermo, 
and Catania – characterized by a proliferation of traditional criminal organizations. 
These organizations role in “protecting” the community seems to be just one of the 
myths revolving around them. 
Last, the territorial distribution patterns of the various crimes are different. 
Especially homicides, extortions and criminal conspiracies – particularly frequent in the 
Southern provinces – reveal a constellation-type distribution, where a high crime 
territorial unit is surrounded by other units with similar crime rates: which advocates 
the presence of the same causes in the entire “constellation”. In line with this, the main 
predictors for these crimes reveal a marked spatial autocorrelation, reproducing the 
abovementioned constellation-type configuration. In other words, these predictors are 
common to all the provinces of a wide area, while there is also evidence of direct 
criminal contagion. Moreover, the “constellations” for homicides, extortions, and 
criminal conspiracies (as well as that for Mafia-type organizations) tend to overlap each 
other, suggesting the existence of common factors behind all these offences. In the 
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Central and Northern provinces instead, the distributions of the various crimes are 
characterized by a low level of spatial autocorrelation: namely, by a situation in which 
a province’s crime rates are independent from those of the surrounding provinces. Also 
the main crime predictors present a low level of spatial autocorrelation. All this 
suggests lack of direct criminal contagion at the territorial level. In the Central-
Northern provinces, crime rates are associated with features belonging to the local 
context, to a specific and limited territory. Therefore, the two criminal scenarios present 
opposing features regarding, first, the type of crime predictors (unemployment, lack of 
both education and social capital versus immigrant population and urban areas) and, 
second, the relationship of such predictors with the territory (diffusion versus 
localization). 
In conclusion, this territorial analysis of crime has been expedient to make 
emerge aspects that analyses based on territorially aggregate data would not detect. 
First, the territorial distributions of several main crimes are different. Therefore, the 
recourse to widely used groupings, like “property crime” and “violent crime”, would be 
misleading. For instance, homicides and rapes – belonging to the group “violent crime” 
– show completely different distributions, along with different backgrounds. This 
implies that any explanation meant for this group as a whole would be spurious, as 
would be, a fortiori, any single explanation for all the crime. In the Southern provinces 
there are still territorial “constellations” of crime having to do not with the anomic 
malaise born out of immigration, cultural change and social transformations, as rather 
with widespread customary cultural traits and underdevelopment. Another set of 
crimes, however, seems to be associated with a non-traditional, more localised 
background, characterized by high urbanization degree, hard drug abuse, and foreign 
immigration. When the analysis is carried out on all the provinces, the two scenarios 
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overlap each other and generate blurred results. However, by focusing on the Central 
and Northern provinces it is possible to distinguish between the two scenarios and to 
detect the emerging of a criminality that has little in common with that usually regarded 
as traditional. 
The emerging of this new criminality and particularly its association with the 
immigrant inflow show that the Italian case is at variance with the situation of both the 
West European countries in the 1950’s-1960’s and the US, Canada, Australia and other 
countries where the rise in immigration has been less tumultuous, illegal immigration 
less massive, immigrant origin often less exotic, and socio-economic opportunities for 
immigrants better than in contemporary Italy. In particular, this research results exclude 
the possibility of applying universally, to the whole immigrant population, the 
immigrant paradox discovered in the US, namely the combination of lower socio-
economic conditions and low crime rates. Concurrently, the fact that immigration 
emerged as associated not only with instrumental crimes – e.g. thefts – but also with 
expressive crimes, such as rapes, hints at crime factors that can hardly be reduced to 
mere lack of material opportunities. 
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Appendix 
Dependent and independent variables used in the analysis: descriptive statistics12
Variables 
  
All the provinces 
(N = 103)  
Central & Northern provinces 
(N = 67) 
Mean Std. dev. Min Max  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Crime          
Intentional homicide (per 100K pop.) ln 0.63 0.76 -0.80 2.37  0.32 0.58 -0.80 1.96 
Rape (per 100K pop.) ln 1.85 0.25 1.28 2.55  1.87 0.26 1.28 2.55 
Exploitation of prostitution (per 100K pop.) ln 0.58 0.73 -1.77 2.33  0.84 0.59 -0.78 2.18 
Theft (per 100K pop.) ln 7.65 0.37 6.84 8.74  7.74 0.37 7.00 8.74 
Robbery (per 100K pop.) ln 3.67 0.66 2.17 6.04  3.60 0.57 2.17 5.05 
Extortion (per 100K pop.) ln 2.38 0.60 1.19 4.03  2.05 0.33 1.19 2.56 
Criminal conspiracy (per 100K pop.) ln 0.22 0.61 -1.61 1.48  0.04 0.58 -1.61 1.39 
Overall crime (per 100K pop.) ln 8.34 0.27 7.79 9.25  8.36 0.30 7.79 9.25 
Population          
Male population aged 15 to 24 years on total m. & f. pop. (%) 6.00 0.94 4.33 8.19  5.42 0.51 4.33 6.91 
Chief town population ln 11.47 0.86 9.96 14.75  11.50 0.87 9.98 14.75 
Population per sq. km. 245 332 37 2,635  256 276 37 1,903 
Residential instability, changes of residence internal or from 
abroad, on res. pop. (%) 2.42 0.74 1.05 3.93 
 
2.83 0.53 1.57 3.93 
Migrant remittances on province’s GDP (%) 0.054 0.038 0.017 0.319  0.057 0.044 0.018 0.319 
Adult immigrants on resident pop. (%) 2.01 1.15 0.34 5.47  2.62 0.93 1.19 5.47 
Adult illegal immigrants on resident pop. (%) 1.22 0.76 0.10 4.10  1.56 0.64 0.50 4.10 
High-crime nat. groups of imm., males on resident pop (%) 0.67 0.41 0.09 2.11  0.87 0.32 0.38 2.11 
Underage immigrants on total resident immigrants (%) 20.2 3.30 12.5 28.0  21.4 2.82 14.3 26.1 
Separated or divorced people on married pop. (%) 6.13 2.54 1.95 14.72  7.50 2.00 3.82 14.72 
Infant mortality, m. & f. (per 1K born alive) 4.54 1.37 1.80 9.50  3.90 0.98 1.80 6.60 
Economics          
GDP per capita (€ ,000) 17.362 4.337 9.953 28.086  20.090 2.509 15.134 28.086 
Income concentration (proxy Gini) 0.29 0.05 0.21 0.46  0.26 0.03 0.21 0.32 
Owner-occupied homes on only houses occupied by residents (%) 73.4 4.28 55.5 85.2  73.1 3.71 65.7 78.8 
Unemployed, males >=15-year old on same age total labour 
forces (%) 6.85 5.92 0.60 23.00 
 
3.26 1.67 0.60 8.73 
Employed, manufacturing sector, on total employed pop. (%) 23.1 9.34 9.20 43.5  27.2 8.59 9.20 43.5 
Professionals & entrepreneurs on total employed pop. (%) 5.56 1.19 3.95 11.01  6.00 1.21 4.38 11.01 
Social capital & culture          
Graduate population on >=6 year old pop. (%) 6.84 1.27 4.57 12.25  6.99 1.41 4.90 12.25 
Compulsory education avoidance, people aged 15 to 24 years on 
same age pop. (%) 2.93 1.35 1.23 7.65 
 
2.30 0.49 1.23 3.70 
General-interest magazines sales (3 mags per 1K pop.) 17.3 5.55 6.71 29.0  20.1 3.92 10.4 29.0 
Voters, 2001 referendum, on registered electors (%) 33.9 8.56 16.1 53.3  38.8 6.04 25.7 53.3 
Illegal & deviant context          
Deaths due to drug abuse (per 100K pop.) 1.51 0.70 0.40 3.71  1.74 0.67 0.78 3.71 
Mafia-type organizations (per 100K pop.) ln 0.21 0.35 0.00 2.00  0.04 0.06 0.00 0.23 
 
                                                          
12 Data underlying the variables were drawn from Istat (Italy’s Institute of Statistics) databases, with the exception of 
migrant remittances data, drawn from Italy’s Central Bank, and magazines sales data, drawn from Federazione 
Italiana Editori Giornali (FIEG) 
  All the dependent variables (crime rates) were logarithmized. Among the explicative/control variables, chief town 
population and Mafia-type organizations were logarithmized due to their particularly skewed distribution. Since 
Mafia-type organizations >= 0, then x = ln(Mafia-type organizations +1) 
